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theoretical weaknesses. Schmidt structures his argument by critically summa- 
rizing pluralist and assimilationist accounts, leading him to disperse key theo- 
retical discussions. For example, the relationship between individual and collective 
identity is discussed partially in the second, third, sixth, and seventh chapters, 
hindering a clear analysis. This approach excessively lengthens the critical 
analyses of pluralistic and assimilationist positions, leaving little room to ex- 
plain the implications of pluralistic integration. Nevertheless, I recommend 
this work for its comprehensive examination of American language policy 
debates, its interesting albeit uncritical reformulation and reapplication of Kym- 
licka's theory, and its suggestions for furthering justice among socially strati- 
fied ethno-linguistic groups. 
Michael Rabinder James, Bucknell University 
Congress, the President, and the Federal Reserve: The Politics of American 
Monetary Policy-Making. By Irwin L. Morris. (Ann Arbor: The University 
of Michigan Press, 2000. Pp. 141. $39.50.) 
Political science is now at a crucial point in its intellectual development. 
Which theoretical frameworks should guide scholars' investigations and which 
methodologies should be employed in empirical tests of those frameworks are 
questions that generate vehement discussions. Congress, the President, and the 
Federal Reserve. The Politics of American Monetary Policy-Making offers a 
thoughtful response to these concerns. This work argues persuasively for the 
application of formal modeling, based on rational choice theory, to policy stud- 
ies. Specifically, it demonstrates the usefulness of a multi-institutional formal 
model in deciphering monetary policy-making in the United States. 
The centerpiece of this book is its multi-institutional model, which the au- 
thor states "provides a theoretical framework for understanding the interrela- 
tionship among the policy preferences of elected officials, the policy preferences 
of the Fed, and the institutional relationship between the Fed and its political 
environment.... The model also provides a useful guide to the empirical analy- 
sis of political pressures on monetary policy" (37). Two assumptions underlie 
the model. First, it presumes that the Fed is the proactive institution; it sets 
monetary policy, albeit with an awareness of the sanctions that the president or 
Congress may impose. Second, it presumes that the president exercises influ- 
ence principally by blocking congressional sanctions. (Consideration is given 
to the president's nomination powers, particularly in regard to the Federal Re- 
serve Board chair, but the author concludes that this power is limited.) The 
model delineates the connections between, on the one hand, different configu- 
rations of presidential and congressional preferences and, on the other hand, 
monetary policies that are more or less protective of price stability. The model 
also takes account of the ways in which preferences may change within the 
Congress, the- presidency, or the Fed, explaining why those changes may (or 
may not) alter policy outcomes. 
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To test the model, the author makes use of both qualitative and quantitative 
research methods. Qualitative methods are represented by brief case studies of 
presidential administrations from Ford through Reagan. These are general over- 
views of the relationships among the president, the Congress, and the Federal 
Reserve Board chairs, and they provide generalized support for the model. Quan- 
titative methods are represented by reaction functions and an extended multiple 
regression analysis. This work specifically demonstrates that the Federal Re- 
serve Board negotiates its Federal Funds rate in order to maximize its own 
preferences for price stability while anticipating Congressional sanctions. Other 
influences on monetary policy making electoral cycles, presidential partisan- 
ship, Congressional committee preferences do not equal in level of signifi- 
cance the variable ("PIVOT") measuring the point at which Congress would 
impose sanctions. 
The author's interest is in proposing a theory of bureaucratic policy-making 
that avoids the drawbacks associated with institutional, pluralist, or principal- 
agent analyses; as much is evident from the carefully deliberate presentation of 
the model over several chapters and an appendix. The empirical work seems 
more of an afterthought, presented in order to prove the efficacy of the model 
rather than to give further explication to its workings. The definition and cal- 
culation of the variables in the regression analysis, for example, are passed 
over quickly. This is most especially evident in regard to the author's calcula- 
tion of the "PIVOT" variable. Similarly, there is comparatively little commen- 
tary on the regression findings. While the argument remains as strong and as 
cogent as in the modeling chapters, the brevity of the empirical chapters leaves 
their deeper implications to the reader's insight. 
There is much here to stimulate a reader's imagination. The conclusion pro- 
vides a list of research projects for game theory-oriented policy analysts. Even 
more intriguing is a chapter that assesses the meaning of the multi-institutional 
model for bureaucratic autonomy or independence. Describing independence 
as a "multi-dimensional concept," the author also demonstrates that "limited 
independence" can only be assessed in proximate terms and therefore con- 
cludes that it is of limited usefulness. Even acknowledging the difficulties as- 
sociated with its measurement, however, bureaucratic autonomy is likely to remain 
a central concern for executive branch and policy analysts. A future study, there- 
fore, could profitably consider the usefulness of the multi-institutional model 
for understanding this facet of bureaucracy. 
Congress, the President, and the Federal Reserve. The Politics of American 
Monetary Policy-Making is an interesting account of monetary policy-making 
that educates its readers in the contributions offered political science by formal 
modeling, rational choice, and game theory. It participates in debates about a 
major policy area and about the discipline, suggesting further directions for 
scholars' research and for practitioners' reflections. 
MaryAnne Borrelli, Connecticut College 
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